Insider Ownership and Bank Performance: Evidence from the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 by Wang, Xinliang
  
  
 
 
 
INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND BANK PERFORMANCE: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-2009 
 
 
by 
 
 
Xinliang Wang 
B.A. (Honours) University of Saskatchewan, 2009  
 
 
 
PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
MASTER OF FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
 
In the Financial Risk Management Program  
of the  
Faculty 
of 
Business Administration 
 
 
© Xinliang Wang 2010 
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 
Summer 2010 
 
 
All rights reserved. However, in accordance with the Copyright Act of Canada, this work 
may be reproduced, without authorization, under the conditions for Fair Dealing. 
Therefore, limited reproduction of this work for the purposes of private study, research, 
criticism, review and news reporting is likely to be in accordance with the law, 
particularly if cited appropriately.
  ii 
 
 
Approval 
 
Name: Xinliang Wang 
Degree: Master of Financial Risk Management 
Title of Project: Insider Ownership and Bank Performance:  
Evidence from the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 
Supervisory Committee: 
  ___________________________________________ 
 Dr.Jijun Niu 
Senior Supervisor 
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Business Administration 
  ___________________________________________ 
 Dr.Yasheng Chen 
Second Reader 
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Business Administration 
Date Approved:  ___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
  iii 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relation between insider ownership and bank 
performance in the United States before and during the recent financial crisis of 2007 – 
2009. For the period before this crisis, we find a curvilinear relation between insider 
ownership and bank performance. Bank performance first increases, then decreases, and 
finally increases again with the rise of insider ownership. During the financial crisis, we 
find an inverted-U shaped relation between insider ownership and bank performance. 
Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that managers with higher ownership 
are better aligned the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976).Managers 
adopt effective strategies on the bank performance before the crisis, but those make a 
negative impact during the financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction  
Over the past three decades, researchers spark lively debate about how insider 
ownership affects firm performance. Some researchers argue that higher insider 
ownership is more favourable to firm performance, because higher insider ownership can 
better align the interests of shareholders and managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
come up with the view that there is a positive relation between insider ownership and 
firm performance. Managers’ incentive will be more convergent with shareholders’ as 
their holdings of shares increase. Larger insider ownership will benefit both shareholders 
and managers because it increases managers’ incentives to enhance firm performance. On 
the other hand, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) argue that the relation between 
insider ownership and firm performance is non-linear. When insider ownership becomes 
larger, managers become more entrenched; hence, firm performance will decrease as the 
insider ownership increases beyond a certain point. The relation between insider 
ownership and firm performance is not monotonically increasing. 
Although a large number of papers have examined the relation between insider 
ownership and firm performance (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009a), relatively few papers have examined the relation between 
insider ownership and bank performance. In this paper, we focus on how the insider 
ownership influences American bank performance both before and during the recent 
financial crisis of 2007 – 2009. We measure insider ownership in two ways: the 
percentage of shares owned by the CEO, and the percentage of shares owned by the 
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directors and officers of the bank as a group. We measure bank performance using both 
return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q. 
For the period before the financial crisis, we find a curvilinear relation between 
insider ownership and bank performance. Bank performance first increases when the 
insider ownership is between 0 and 15 percent, then decreases until it reaches 50 percent, 
beyond 50 percent, bank value begins to increase again with the rise of insider ownership. 
This finding is consistent with the explanation proposed by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988): low levels of ownership align the interests of shareholders and managers, but 
high levels of ownership entrench managers. Finally, at very high levels of ownership, 
incentive alignment effect exceeds entrenchment effect. 
We also find that during the financial crisis this relation changed. There exists an 
inverted-U shaped relation between insider ownership and bank performance. In 
particular, banks with high levels of insider ownership performed worse. This result  
supports the recent findings of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009b). That is, managers better 
aligned with shareholders performed worse in the recent financial crisis. These managers 
did not reduce their shares in anticipation of the coming recession and suffered large 
losses the same as the shareholders. Furthermore, we find that insider ownership is better 
measured using the percentage of shares owned by the directors and officers of the bank 
as a group, which is opposed to Griffith et al. (2002).  
This paper joins the small literature that examines the impact of insider ownership 
on bank performance. Glassman and Rhoades (1980) test the relation between the degree 
of owner control and the goals in commercial banking. They find that owners controlled 
banks generate higher profit than managers controlled banks. Gorton and Rosen (1995) 
address the corporate control considerations, they use the sample in the 1980s, the time 
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that U.S. banks is less profitable and more risky and propose that management 
entrenchment have the dominant effect on the bank failures, rather than the moral hazard 
regarding the deposit insurance. Shehzad et al. (2010) conduct an examination on the 
impact of bank ownership concentration concerning the bank riskiness. Using a sample of 
500 commercial banks for 2005 to 2007, they find that concentrated ownership can 
reduce bank’s non-performing loans ratio and affect the capital adequacy ratio. If the 
shareholder protection rights and supervisory control is low, ownership concentration can 
also reduce the bank riskiness. Our paper contributes to this literature by examining the 
relation between insider ownership and bank performance using data both before and 
during a severe financial crisis. In addition, we find that the relation changes during the 
crisis. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology that we used in 
the regression. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the regressions both in the pre-
crisis and financial crisis period. Section 5 concludes this study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Literature Review  
There have been many studies discussing the issues of managerial ownership and 
performance, but most are built on the firm value. In this section, we will conduct a brief 
review about these relevant contributions. 
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Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) make an investigation on the relation between 
management ownership and firm value by using Tobin’s q as a measure of firm 
performance. They find that Tobin’s q increases with insider ownership within the range 
of 0 to 5 percent. Once managerial ownership is beyond 5 percent level, the conditions of 
entrenchment play an important role associated with the management ownership, and 
Tobin’s q decreases as ownership increases from 5 percent to 25 percent. They also find 
that Tobin’s q increases slowly again beyond 25 percent. They suggest that convergence 
of interest effect still exists during the entire evolvement of ownership. 
Stulz (1988) examines how the managerial control of voting rights influence the 
firm value. Stulz proposes that shareholders’ wealth increases as the manager strengthens 
its control of voting rights. However, beyond a certain level, greater ownership of control 
rights can decrease the firm performance, because higher management ownership gives 
greater control to the manager. Moreover, Stulz argues that if managers can not be 
replaced by shareholders or hostile takeover, they have stronger incentives than others to 
maximize their own lifetime utilities. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a curvilinear relation between firm 
performance and insider ownership. Their research is based on the sample period of 1976 
and 1986 and they assume that firm value is a function of the equity ownership. They 
find that the relation between Tobin’s q and insider ownership is positive until the 
ownership reaches about 40 to 50 percent, and then becomes slightly negative. They also 
find a significantly positive relation between Tobin’s q and institutional investors’ 
ownership. 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009a) test the dynamic changes of managerial ownership 
and their implications for firm performance. They find that if firms perform well, it is 
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possible for managers to decrease their ownership. Similarly, when firms perform poorly, 
managers are more likely to increase their ownership. 
In order to generate a meaningful result and overcome the failure of fixed effects 
regression, Benson and Davidson III (2009) use the pay-performance semi-elasticity 
instead of pay-performance sensitivity to measure the insider ownership. They find that 
there is an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm 
performance in terms of Tobin’s q with fixed effects estimator.  
However, some studies find that there is no evidence indicating that ownership 
has any influence on performance. Loderer and Martin (1997) examine the relation 
between managers’ financial interests and firm performance. They find that acquisition 
performance and Tobin’s q can influence the managerial ownership, but large managers’ 
stockholdings cannot lead to better firm performance.  
Cho (1998) also shows that corporate value affects ownership structure, but not 
vice versa. Instead of using ordinary least squares regression, they use the simultaneous 
regression suggesting that the investment affects corporate performance ,then in turn 
influence the ownership structure.    
Similarly, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) believe that no statistically significant 
relation between ownership structure and corporate performance, if ownership is made 
multi-dimensional and considered as an endogenous variable. 
Indeed, there is disagreement on the issues of relation between insider ownership 
and firm value. To resolve this issue and highlight the bank performance, we make this 
paper to investigate how the insider ownership affects the bank performance as measured 
by ROA and Tobin’s q. 
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2.2 Testable Hypotheses 
We develop two hypotheses in this paper; the first hypothesis is to test whether 
the relation between CEO ownership and bank performance is significant and non-linear. 
This hypothesis is based on the views of Griffith (1999) and Griffith et al. (2002).They 
find that the CEO ownership has a dominating effect on the firm performance, not the 
management ownership if CEO ownership is separated out.Besides,they believe that 
Chief Executive Officer individually has the power to influence bank performance, 
including either positive or negative impact. The second hypothesis expands the scope of 
ownership, which adds the shares that directors and other officers hold (e.g., Benson et al. 
2009). Adam et al. (2010) explain the importance of the boards of directors in a 
corporation. They state that board of directors is fundamental in a corporation 
development, and is often modelled as the single decision maker. We seek to see which, 
if any, measure of insider ownership is related to bank performance. In both hypotheses, 
we also include the squared and cubed terms of insider ownership in the regression 
models. If the relation between performance and ownership is significant and either the 
squared or cubed of ownership is significant, we can conclude that the relation is 
nonlinear. These two testable hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: The relation between CEO ownership and bank performance is non-linear and 
significant. 
H2: The relation between director and officer ownership and bank performance is non- 
linear and significant 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data sources 
This paper uses the panel data set and pooled OLS regressions to investigate the 
relation between insider ownership and bank performance. The sample includes 100 
largest publicly traded banks by the year 2000 assets that are headquarter in the United 
States and operated at anytime between 2000 and 2009. We use Compustat database at 
the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) to identify publicly traded banks and 
obtain accounting information. Ownership data are hand collected from proxy statements 
from the EDGAR database at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as it is 
superior comparing to other data sources.  
Table 1 presents the number of banks in our sample by year. The first seven years 
(2000-2006) are the periods before the financial crisis, and the last three years (2007-
2009) are during the financial crisis (Appendices Table 1). The number of banks in our 
sample decreased during these 10 years. Cornett et al. (2009) explain that mergers and 
acquisitions rather than bank failures are the main reason behind this decrease. 
 
3.1.1 Dependent variables 
Return on Assets (ROA): ROA is defined as the net income divided by total asset. We 
use ROA to see how profitable banks are relative to their total assets and how efficient 
bank management is to use their assets generating profits. We calculate the annual 
average ROA percentage value of our sample banks. 
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As Figure 1 shown, ROA was stable and about 1.2% during the period 2000 
through 2006. However, since 2007 ROA dramatically decreased from 1.2% to -0.4%, 
which implies that the financial crisis hit the banking industry severely. 
Figure 1 
 
          As shown in Figure 2, for our sample banks during the crisis period, the worst 25% 
percentile banks suffered greatest loss of 2%. The Median banks suffered moderate loss 
of 1%, and the 75% percentile suffered a loss of 0.5%.The difference among these three 
percentile is significant. 
            Figure 2 
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Tobin’s q: We also use the Tobin’s q to measure bank performance. It is defined as the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets of the bank. Market value of 
assets equals the sum of market value of equity and the book value of liabilities, and the 
book value of assets equals the sum of the book value of equity and the book value of 
liabilities. Higher value of q implies better performance. A q value greater than one 
indicates that the market value of assets is larger than the book value of assets. 
Morck ,Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Griffith (1999) 
all use q as a measure of performance. 
Figure 3 presents that for our sample banks Tobin’s q ranged from 1.05 to 1.15 
before the recent financial crisis. During the depression, average Tobin’s q dropped from 
1.05 to 1. 
Figure 3 
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3.1.2 Independent variables 
Bank Size: We use the natural log of total asset to measure bank size. 
Capital Ratio: Capital Ratio is defined as total equity divided by total assets. It is a key 
financial ratio to measure banks’ financial stability and capital adequacy. Generally, a 
higher capital ratio is associated with a safer bank. 
CEO ownership is the percentage of common shares held by the Chief Executive Officer 
of the bank. 
Director and officer ownership is the percentage of common shares held by the 
directors and officers of the bank as a group. 
 
3.2Methodology 
We are trying to look for which, if any, of the ownership are statistically 
significant to predict the bank performance from the data we explained in section3.1.We 
use the following equation to estimate the relation between insider ownership and bank 
performance: 
Performancei,t=β0+β1*Sizei,t+β2*Capitali,t+β3*Ownershipi,t+β4*(Ownershipi,t)
2 
+β5(Ownershipi,t)
3+γt+εi,t                                                                           (1) 
In separate regressions Performancei,t is measured by ROA and Tobin’s q , 
respectively. The independent variables include bank size, capital ratio, ownership, 
ownership square, and ownership cubic. Ownership is measured by CEO ownership or 
director and officer ownership, respectively. γt are year fixed effects, which are used to 
control for possible time variation in the banking industry. εi,t is the random error. 
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Ownership is measured at the beginning of a fiscal year, while Size and Capital are 
measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
We conduct separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for the period of 
2000 to 2006 and the period of 2007 to 2009. Since observations on the same bank over 
time are likely to be dependent, standard errors are clustered at the bank level. We do not 
include bank fixed effects in the model, because year-to-year variation of insider 
ownership within a firm tends to be very small, and Zhou (2001) shows that fixed effects 
estimator lacks statistical power in this circumstance. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistical of main variables. The dependent 
variables in the regressions are ROA and Tobin’s q. We separate the 10-year period into 
two sub-periods and make a comparison of these two sub-periods. Before the financial 
crisis, the mean of ROA was 0.0126, however, the mean value decreased to 0.0024 
during the crisis. The difference of the mean is 0.0103, which is statistically significant as 
indicated by the t-statistic of 8.6157. The standard deviation of ROA in the period of 
2007 to 2009 increased a lot, which was 0.0155. Bank performance differed a lot during 
the financial crisis. We find similar results in the other performance of Tobin’s q. The 
mean value of Tobin’s q between 2000 and 2006 was 1.1147. It dropped to 1.0181 
between 2007 and 2009. There is a significant mean difference at 1% level between the 
two sub-periods. In short, banks performed worse during the financial crisis. Due to 
mergers and acquisitions among publicly traded banks, average bank size increased 
during our sample period. In contrast to ROA and Tobin’s q, the mean difference of 
insider ownership (measured either as CEO ownership or director and officer ownership) 
is not significant (Appendices Table 2).This is consistent with the findings of 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009b), who show that bank insiders didn’t reduce their 
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ownership during the recent financial crisis. As a result, they suffered a great loss along 
with other shareholders when the banks performed poorly during the recent financial 
crisis. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Pre-crisis period 
Table 3 reports the OLS regression results in the pre-crisis period from 2000 to 
2006. In column (1) and (2), ROA is the dependent variable. In column (3) and (4), 
Tobin’s q is the dependent variable. In column (1) and (3), CEO ownership is included in 
the regression. In column (2) and (4), director and officer ownership is included in the 
regression. 
From the regression results, we find that the estimated coefficients on CEO 
ownership, CEO ownership square, and CEO ownership cubic are insignificant, no matter 
whether the dependent variable is ROA or Tobin’s q. However, director and officer 
ownership enters significantly in both ROA and Tobin’s q regressions. The sign of the 
estimated coefficients on director and officer ownership, director and officer ownership 
square and director and officer ownership cubic are positive, negative and 
positive.(Appendices Table 3) 
We draw a curve line to present the results intuitively. Figure 4 shows how the 
performance evolves with the changes of director and officer ownership in the pre-crisis 
period. The model indicates ROA increases when the director and officer ownership is 
between 0 and 15 percent, decreases between 15 and 50 percent, and increases again 
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when director and officer ownership is higher than 50 percent. This implies that the 
convergence of interest have a bigger impact than that of entrenchment as the rise value 
in ownership. 
Figure 4 
 
The relation between Tobin’s q and director and officer ownership is similar. 
Tobin’s q increases if the director and officer ownership is between 0 and 15 percent, 
decreases between 15 and 51 percent, when the market is not capable of disciplining 
directors and officers. Once the director and officer own more than 51 percent of the 
shares of the bank, we find that Tobin’s q increases again with the rise of insider 
ownership. (Figure 5) 
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Figure 5 
 
Overall, during the year of 2000 to 2006, insider ownership (as measure by 
director and officer ownership) has a non-linear relation with bank performance. 
Therefore, we reject the first hypothesis (that there is a non-linear and significant relation 
between CEO ownership and bank performance). But we cannot reject the second 
hypothesis (that there is a non-linear and significant relation between director and officer 
ownership and bank performance).Generally, our pre-crisis period results support both 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) argument of convergence of interest, and Morck, Shlerifer, 
and Vishny’s (1988) argument of managerial entrenchment. If managers hold some 
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by selling the equity at a higher price to outside investors (Stulz 1988). Specifically, 
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of shares outstanding. Sullivan and Spong (2007) propose that if the insiders concentrate 
on their wealth in the bank, then the variation of bank profit decreases .When hired-
managers have enough motivation to control and monitor the bank, banks will face less 
risk in the market.But bank performance will decline when the director and officer 
ownership is beyond a certain level, such as 50 percent, managers are entrenched and turn 
to maximize their profits and utilities. Finally, when managers own a large amount of 
shares, bank performance increase again. Once managers obtain a high level of 
ownership, convergence of interest effect will dominant the entrenchment effect. In these 
figures, we can see that the convergence-of- interest effect have an influence through the 
whole evolvement of the ownership. 
4.2 Financial Crisis period 
Since the recent financial crisis caused a significant loss to the banking industry, 
we need to check whether the relation above is still valid during the crisis period. Table 4 
presents the regression results during the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. The 
estimated coefficients on CEO ownership are significant when ROA is a dependent 
variable and insignificant when Tobin’s q is a dependent variable. In contrast, the 
coefficients on director and officer ownership are statistically significant in both ROA 
and Tobin’s q regressions. (Appendices Table 4) We calculate bank performance as a 
function of director and officer ownership. The model implies that ROA increases when 
director and officer ownership is between 0 and 25 percent, and decreases when the 
ownership is above 25 percent. (Figure 6) 
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Figure 6 
 
The relation between Tobin’s q and director and officer ownership is similar. 
Tobin’s q increases when the ownership is between 0 and 20 percent, and decreases as 
the director and officer ownership is above 20 percent (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 
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before the financial crisis, and performed worse during the crisis. They argue that 
managers with higher ownership have strong motivations to maximize shareholder 
interests. These managers adopted strategies that worked out very well before the crisis. 
However, the same strategies failed during the crisis. Our result supports their findings in 
the following sense. Before crisis, performance increases with insider ownership when 
ownership is above a critical level. During crisis, however, performance decreases with 
insider ownership beyond a critical level. People are willing to take some certain level of 
risk because higher risk can generate higher profits. Yet investors are very cautions about 
their money during the financial crisis, they do not want to take any risk .Hence, in the 
crisis period, high risk cannot lead to better performance. If managers continue to 
increase their shares of stock, they will suffer greater loss due to the economic depression. 
Our results also suggest that insider ownership is better measured by director and 
officer ownership, rather than CEO ownership. These results are consistent with the 
notion that board of directors affects firm performance (Adam et al. 2010). 
 
5. Conclusion  
This study examines the relation between insider ownership and bank 
performance. Insider ownership is measured in two ways: CEO ownership, or director 
and officer ownership. We use ROA and Tobin’s q to measure bank performance. The 
results are built on the sample of 100 largest publicly traded banks with headquarters 
located in the United States. The 10 years period of 2000 to 2009 is divided into two sub-
  18 
periods. The first sub-period is pre-crisis ranging from 2000 to 2006; the second one is in 
financial crisis beginning with 2007 through 2009. 
For the sub-period before financial crisis, we find that the relation between bank 
performance and insider ownership is curvilinear, which is consistent with the result of 
Griffith et al.(2002)Performance rises until the director and officer ownership approaches 
15 percent and declines when the ownership is between 15 percent and 50 percent 
approximately. After the optimum point of 50 percent, bank value rises again. In general, 
the result is confirming and consistent with the findings of Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny(1988) and McConnell and Servaes(1990). 
During financial crisis, the relation between insider ownership and bank 
performance is still non-linear. Specifically, there is an inverted U-shaped relation. Bank 
performance first increases between 0 and 20 percent approximately, and then decreases 
when ownership is above 20 percent level. It indicates to investors that if the bank 
performance looks well, it may undertake the things that involve the potential risk or 
danger. 
Lastly, we find that director and officer ownership better measures the alignment 
of interests between managers and shareholders. CEO ownership as the fraction of only 
one officer’s shares is not a good indicator to display this relationship, which is opposite 
with the views of Griffith (1999).  
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Appendices 
Table 1 
Number of banks in our sample by year 
  
Year Number of Banks 
2000 96 
2001 91 
2002 90 
2003 89 
2004 80 
2005 73 
2006 70 
2007 62 
2008 58 
2009 55 
Total 764 
 
This table presents the number of banks in our sample by year. We start with the 
100 largest banks by the year 2000 assets headquartered in the United States. We obtain 
accounting data for our sample banks from the Compustat database at WRDS. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics of main variables in our sample 
 2000-2006       2007-2009  
 Obs. Mean St Dev Obs. Mean St Dev Mean 
Difference 
t-stat 
ROA 589 0.0126 0.0051 175 0.0024 0.0155 0.0103*** 8.6157 
Tobin’s q 589 1.1147 0.0857 175 1.0181 0.0679 0.0966*** 15.5080 
Size 589 4.2795 0.5613 175 4.4589 0.6405 -0.1794*** -3.3435 
Capital 589 0.0867 0.0207 175 0.0876 0.0199 -0.0009 -0.5221 
CEO 
Ownership 
538 0.0257 0.0667 168 0.0386 0.2764 -0.0129 -0.5999 
D&O 
Ownership 
514 0.0812 0.0987 165 0.1537 0.5982 -0.0724 -0.7730 
This table shows the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and 
mean difference of the main variables used in our regressions. ROA is net income 
divided by the total asset. Tobin’s q is the market value of assets divided by the book 
value of assets. CEO Ownership is the number of shares owned by the CEO divided by 
the total number of shares outstanding. Director and Officer Ownership (D&O 
Ownership) is the number of shares owned by the directors and officers of the bank as a 
group divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Size is the natural log of total 
asset. Capital Ratio is book value of equity divided by total assets. *** indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3 
The relation between insider ownership and bank performance in the pre-crisis period 
This table presents the regression results that relate ROA and Tobin’s q to Bank 
size, Capital ratio, and insider ownership during the pre-crisis period from 2000 to 2006. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at bank level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  ROA  Tobin’s q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.000 -0.005 1.056*** 0.984*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.081) (0.102) 
     
Size 0.001 0.002* -0.001 0.012 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.015) 
     
Capital 0.124*** 0.117*** 1.040** 0.955* 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.516) (0.512) 
     
CEO Ownership 0.017  0.251  
 (0.031)  (0.544)  
     
(CEO Ownership)
2
 -0.115  -2.151  
 (0.136)  (2.353)  
     
(CEO Ownership)
3
 0.150  2.517  
 (0.148)  (2.651)  
     
D&O Ownership  0.053**  0.788* 
  (0.022)  (0.403) 
     
(D&O Ownership)
2
  -0.254***  -3.806** 
  (0.087)  (1.625) 
     
(D&O Ownership)
3
  0.272***  3.903** 
  (0.088)  (1.773) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 538 514 538 514 
R-squared 0.261 0.298 0.120 0.151 
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Table 4 
The relation between insider ownership and bank performance during crisis period 
This table presents the regression results that relate ROA and Tobin’s q to Bank 
size, Capital ratio, and insider ownership during the crisis period from 2007 to 2009. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at bank level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  ROA  Tobin’s q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.043*** -0.053*** 1.023*** 0.997*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.051) (0.056) 
     
Size 0.002 0.004 -0.012 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) 
     
Capital 0.321*** 0.319*** 0.168 0.061 
 (0.084) (0.082) (0.351) (0.354) 
     
CEO Ownership 0.305**  1.307  
 (0.135)  (1.129)  
     
(CEO Ownership)
2
 -1.936**  -9.142  
 (0.938)  (7.582)  
     
(CEO Ownership)
3
 0.518**  2.452  
 (0.252)  (2.032)  
     
D&O Ownership  0.138***  0.543* 
  (0.049)  (0.299) 
     
(D&O Ownership)
2
  -0.287**  -1.385* 
  (0.110)  (0.741) 
     
(D&O Ownership)
3
  0.018**  0.087* 
  (0.007)  (0.047) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 168 165 168 165 
R-squared 0.315 0.329 0.203 0.212 
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